Kankoh Maru Flight Manual

FLIGHT MANUAL

USAF SERIES

S-1A, S-1B, AND S-1C SPACECRAFT

Appendix to "Pilot Procedures for Kankoh-Maru Operations", E Anderson & P Collins.

SECTION I - DESCRIPTION

THE SPACECRAFT.

The Kawasaki S-1 is an aluminum and composite, vertical-takeoff, vertical landing, base-first entry, single-stage to orbit spacecraft. The spacecraft consists of two sections: the propulsion section, and the payload section surmounting it. The cockpit is located atop the payload section.

PROPULSION.

Thrust for takeoff is supplied by 12 Mitsubishi LE-9 engines, burning liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. 4 of the engines are LE-9B-3 "booster" engines, optimized for low altitude operation. The other 8 engines are LE-9S-3 "Sustainer" engines, optimized for vacuum operation. The vehicle afterbody is designed to use the vehicle exhaust and the atmosphere as an "aerospike" nozzle to increase efficiency at all altitudes.

Thrust:

LE-9B-3 Boosters - sea level : 162,959 lbs, 725,000 N
LE-9S-3 Sustainers - vacuum : 193,527 lbs, 861,000 N

SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION.

The important dimensions of the spacecraft are:

Height		76' 4.5"	(23.5m)
Base diameter		58' 6"	(18m)
Cargo Compartment
	Diameter	32' 6"	(12m)
	Height	58' 6"	(18m)
Maximum gross weight		1,212,750 lbs	(550,000 kg)
Empty weight
	[A]	116,534 lbs	(52,850 kg)
	[B]	110,272 lbs	(50,010 kg)
	[C]	100,879 lbs	(45,750 kg)

(For complete weight information, see Section V)

Base View

CREW.

The S-1 employs a "split crew" concept. On-board crew stations are provided for a Pilot (P) and a systems operator and payload specialist, or Flight Engineer (FE). The pilot and flight engineer are seated on the right and left sides, respectively, of the center console in the cockpit. Additionally, the Copilot (CP), Navigator (N), and Ground Crew Chief (CC) are located on the ground, maintaining a real-time link to the spacecraft through satellite telephone link.

This arrangement allows the spacecraft to function at reduced capability even with the loss of all communications links, as the Pilot and Flight Engineer are capable of operating the spacecraft autonomously. The ground-based personnel provide safety through redundancy and reduction of individual workload, as well as providing a safe environment in which to train Copilots to become Pilots, and Navigators to become Flight Engineers.

FLIGHT STATION LAYOUT.

The two-crew flight station is unusual in that the spacecraft commander and pilot sits on the right side of the cockpit, while the flight engineer and systems operator is located on the left. This arrangement facilitates manipulation of the (centrally mounted) engine throttles by either the pilot or the flight engineer. Only the pilot has access to the three-axis sidearm controller, on the right side of the pilot's station. The three-axis RCS translation controller is mounted on the center pedestal, but can comfortably be manipulated only by the pilot.

The throttle and engine instrumentation layout is also unusual for an aerospace craft. The throttles are not lined up in numerical order, but are grouped in opposing pairs and by function. From left to right, the throttles are for #12, #6, #3, #9 (all booster engines), #10, #4, #1, #7 (sustainer group 1), #11, #5, #2, and #8 (sustainer group 2). Engine monitoring strip gauges are grouped similarly on the engine panel.

The view from the flight station is provided by three tinted quartz-coated polycarbonate windows. On [A], the outboard panes, directly overhead the crew members, are jettisonable during the ejection sequence.

A periscope is mounted overhead and to the left of the pilot to aid in landings. Flight station multifunction displays can also call on the display from either of two video cameras mounted in the vehicle base, also to aid in landing.

The backup GPS flight director, mounted on the left side of the pilot, is a modified notebook computer connected to a dual differential GPS set. The system's batteries are independent of the spacecraft's power systems, and the navigation software was written independently, thus providing a completely redundant system for navigation during launch, on-orbit and rendezvous, descent, and landing.

ENGINES.

The 12 LE-9 expander-cycle engines are electrically controlled through a Full-Authority Digital Electronic Control system, or FADEC. In the event of failure of the FADEC or loss of power, the engine reverts to a manual control scheme. The engine defaults to RUN mode, and throttle is mechanically manipulated through the respective control cable. The cable is linked to the throttle levers in the cockpit through a mechanical mixer, which adjusts the selected thrust level based on the position of the sidearm controller, thus providing a residual steering capability.

The minimum power level of the LE-9 is approximately 5% of maximum thrust, or about 30% RPM. For other operating limits of the engine, see Section V.

For operation of the emergency systems of the engine, see Section III.

The following systems are driven by the accessory gearbox of the main turbopump shaft:

TACHOMETER GENERATOR.

The Tachometer Generator supplies power to the respective RPM gauge, and the RPM input for the FADEC. Thus, the RPM gauges operate independently of other spacecraft power systems.

[A][B] HYDRAULIC PUMP.

The engine-driven hydraulic pump supplies hydraulic power to one of two hydraulic systems (odd-numbered engines to the Odd system, even-numbered engines to the Even system). The hydraulic systems provide power to operate the drag flaps and landing gear. See Section V for operating limits.

[A][B] GENERATOR.

The engine-driven generator supplies electrical power to spacecraft systems through one of four AC electrical buses. A system of relays ensures that all buses are powered to the maximum extent possible; when the number of operating generators is reduced to less than four, some buses will not be powered. Since each component can choose from exactly two buses, systems will drop off-line when the number of generators is reduced to one.

The generators are 10 KVa units supplying AC power at 120 volts, 400 Hz. Actual frequency is allowed to vary between 380 and 420 Hz. To keep frequency within these limits throughout the throttle range, an automatic gearbox will shift to keep the generator operating within limits. Failure of the gearbox to shift will disconnect the generator from the bus, and illuminate the GEN OUT light on the master caution and warning panel.

[C] TURBO-ALTERNATORS.

The engine turbo-alternator supplies electrical power to spacecraft systems through one of four AC electrical buses. A system of relays ensures that all buses are powered to the maximum extent possible; when the number of operating turbo-alternators is reduced to less than four, some buses will not be powered. Since each component can choose form exactly two buses, systems will drop off-line when the number of turbo-alternators is reduced to one.

The turbo-alternators employ high-pressure, high-temperature gas tapped off from the combustion chamber. The gas, supplied through a tap-off valve, is used to turn a constant-speed turbine which turns an AC alternator/generator. The turbo-alternator can supply 20 KVa AC power at 120 volts, 400 Hz.

ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS.

The AC electrical system consists of four buses (A, B, C, and D), supplied by external power, engine-driven generators or turbo-alternators, or fuel cell power supplied through an inverter.

Each of the AC buses passes the incoming power through a Bus Power Unit (BPU) before supplying it to spacecraft systems. The BPU cleans the power of spikes and overvoltages. It also drops the bus off the line in the event of a short circuit. In the event of BPU failure, the BPU will simply pass power through, unmodified, and a BPU FAIL light will illuminate on the master caution and warning panel.

Each individual component employing AC power will autonomously select between the "cleaner" and more stable of two AC buses. The two allowable AC buses are different for different components in order to provide system redundancy. For a description of allowable buses see the individual system descriptions in Sections I or IV. The staggered allocation of AC buses is to prevent certain bus malfunctions from disabling all systems; even with the failure of several circuit protection systems, a faulty component cannot disable all electrical systems.

The DC electrical system consists of two DC buses (Left and Right), plus the Battery Bus, which is supplied directly by the battery. The Left system is supplied by two Transformer-Rectifiers (TR's) each from buses A and B. The Right system is supplied by two TR's each from AC buses C and D.

During normal operation, the battery bus is supplied by the Left and Right buses through a power control unit. This enables the battery to be recharged in flight.

For ground operation before external power is applied, or for in-flight loss of AC power, the Bus Tie switch can allow the battery bus to supply power to the Left DC bus only. This allows DC power to be supplied to most mission-essential controls.

[A][B] HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.

There are two independent hydraulic systems: the Odd system (fed by odd-numbered engines) and the Even system (fed by even-numbered engines). Each system can also be fed by its own AC electrical auxiliary pump, which is the primary method of manipulating drag flaps during re-entry.

Each drag flap actuator, and each landing gear actuator, is powered by both hydraulic systems. If either system is lost, all hydraulic actuators will work, though slower actuation is likely.

SECTION II - NORMAL PROCEDURES

PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT.

WARNING : During ground operations, engine shutdown may be accomplished by pulling the appropriate throttles over the detent and into the CUTOFF range. Do not shut down the engines using the propellant shutoff T-handles as a normal procedure, as damage to the engine turbines or propellant lines may result.

NOTE : Unless specifically allowed, do not initiate any checklist unless called for by the pilot.

The flight manual contains only amplified procedures. Individual crew checklists are issued as separate technical orders.

Line (numbered) items in the flight manual and crew checklists are identical as pertains to arrangement and item number.

PREFLIGHT CHECK.

Check that the spacecraft has been serviced with the proper amounts of fuel, oxidizer, oil, hydraulic fluid, and oxygen. It is the responsibility of the pilot to ensure that appropriate inspections have been accomplished. During the BEFORE EXTERIOR INSPECTION and before any electrical power is applied to the spacecraft, the flight engineer will assure that all locking pins, duct plugs, and probe covers are removed.

WARNING : If upon entering the spacecraft fumes are present and suspected of being toxic or flammable, or the gaseous hydrogen detector illuminates, evacuate the area. Do not proceed with the flight until the fumes are investigated and eliminated.

CAUTION : Prior to applying electrical power, check the Form 781 and ensure that all switches are in their normal shutdown position.

BEFORE EXTERIOR INSPECTION.

{Deleted for brevity}

EXTERIOR INSPECTION.

{Deleted for brevity}

INTERIOR INSPECTION.

{Deleted for brevity}

COCKPIT CHECKLIST.

This checklist will be completed prior to commencing the BEFORE STARTING ENGINES checklist and will normally be completed by the flight engineer before the pilot assumes his crew position. A crew member will remain at the spacecraft after completion of this checklist. If this checklist is completed and the spacecraft does not fly, complete the ENGINE SHUTDOWN checklist and the BEFORE LEAVING THE SPACECRAFT checklist (as applicable) before securing the spacecraft.

1. Landing gear pins, pitot and probe covers, dust excluders, duct plugs, and ground wires - Removed
2. External AC generator frequency and voltage - Checked
3. Circuit breakers - Checked
4. Satellite link to FOCC - ON, checked
5. Pressurization and air conditioning panel - Checked
   1. Aft and flight deck shutoff switches - NORMAL
   2. Air conditioning master switch - OFF
   3. Aft and flight deck temperature controls - OFF
   4. Aft underfloor heating switch - OFF
6. Fuel cell reactant valves A, B, C - CLOSED
7. Fuel panel Set
   1. Propellant tank pressures - Checked
   2. Emergency dump valves - CLOSED
   3. RCS valves - CLOSED
   4. Main - RCS transfer valves - CLOSED
   5. Propellant boost pump switches - OFF
8. Fire handles - In
9. Engine panel - Set
   1. Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) - AUTO
   2. Main valves - CLOSED
   3. Chill valves - CLOSED
   4. Mode select switch - CHILL
   5. GHe pressurization switch - LOW
   6. GHe purge button - Depressed
10. RCS switch - Manual
11. RCS mode switch - Rotation

BEFORE STARTING ENGINES.

STARTING ENGINES CHECKLIST

Normal engine start sequence is the boosters (3, 6, 9, then 12) followed by the sustainers in opposing pairs/adjacent throttles and instruments (1 & 7 together, then 2 & 8, 4 & 10, 5 & 11). The FE is primarily responsible for monitoring the start. CC will monitor the start as well, concentrating on monitoring those instruments not available on the engineer's panel. Should any crew member notice a condition which would necessitate discontinuing a start, he will call out "Stop Start", and state the reason. The pilot will discontinue the start by placing the affected throttle(s) to CUTOFF and releasing the engine start button, unless a specific emergency dictates other action.

During start, an engine should accelerate smoothly and continuously, RPM's, combustion temperature, and combustion pressure should increase within normal limits, and the engine should stabilize on speed (at idle) within 10 seconds.

PILOT, COPILOT Clear exhaust area - "Exhaust clear" (CC) No. 3 engine - "Turning" (P) Throttle - IDLE Start button - Depressed NOTE : The pilot should keep one hand on the throttle throughout the start. Be prepared to discontinue the start immediately should a malfunction occur. Release the start button after a definite rise in combustion temperature is observed. Wait for the engine to stabilize in IDLE. Repeat step 2 until all engines are started. Starting engines checks - "Complete" (FE), (N), (CC), (CP)

FE, N, CC Engine chilldown - "Complete" (FE) Propellant tank pressures - Checked (CC) After exhaust area is cleared by CC: GHe pressurization switch - HIGH (FE) Propellant boost pump switches - ON (FE) FADEC - As Required (FE) Chill valves - CLOSED (FE) Main valves - OPEN (FE) Mode select switch - "START" (FE) After engine is on speed: #3 generator or turbo-alternator - Checked, ON (FE) Ensure External Power switch rotates to OFF and the external power light goes out. Repeat step 9 until all engines are started. Air conditioning - ON, NO PRESS (FE) Propellant boost pump switches - OFF (FE) Mode Select switch - RUN (FE) Starting engines checks - "Complete" (FE), (N), (CC), (CP)

BEFORE TAKEOFF.

TAKEOFF.

Takeoff is accomplished by smoothly moving all throttles to 100% and maintaining spacecraft alignment or, if on autopilot, monitoring trajectory deviation. Takeoff can also be accomplished by turning the autothrottle to ON, but this is not recommended, as an abort will require greater reaction time.

The FE and CC will monitor engine instruments. The N will monitor trajectory deviation and the performance of the navigational instruments, and advise the pilot of any corrections needed. The CP will back up the pilot, and monitor other systems for faults.

During the first few thousand feet of climbout, it is important to check the cabin and passenger compartment pressure gages to ensure that the cabins are pressurizing properly. In the event of a failure to pressurize or a slow leak, an abort may be necessary.

CLIMBOUT.

On climbout, use of the autothrottle is recommended once above 5,000 feet AGL. However, manual scheduling of the throttles is possible, with moderate loss of fuel margin.

When vertical acceleration reaches 3 G's, or when the autothrottle system has reduced all booster engines to IDLE, reduce throttle on all booster engines to CUTOFF. Monitor engine shutdown.

Use sustainer throttles as required to maintain 3 G's during ascent. When less than 50% throttle is required to accomplish this, shut down 4 sustainer engines (odd-numbered set) by bringing their throttles to CUTOFF. Use throttle as required on the remaining 4 engines to maintain 3 G's.

Approaching orbital velocity, use throttles as dictated by the trajectory computer scheduler. Bring remaining throttles to cutoff when orbital parameters have been reached.

When autothrottle is fully enabled, monitor engines during climbout to ensure the autothrottle is operating correctly.

ON-ORBIT.

RENDEZVOUS.

BEFORE DOCKING.

POST-DOCKING.

If an extended stay (more than 12 hours) at the orbiting station is planned, continue with applicable items from the Post-Landing checklist.

PRE-DEPARTURE.

If the crew has performed any portion of the Post-Landing checklist, first perform all applicable items from the Cockpit checklist.

PILOT, COPILOT Forms - "Checked" (CP) Oxygen - "Set" (P), (FE) Regulator - ON, 100% Pressure suit - Purged Hoses, connections - Checked Helmet - On, visor open Radio - ON, checked (P), (CP) GPWS and radar altimeter warning horn - SELF-TEST (P) EFI's / flight directors - "ON" (P), (FE) Backup GPS flight director - ON, checked, battery level checked (P) Lights - "Set" (P) Interior - As required Exterior - ANTI-COLLISION Landing gear - "UP, indicators checked" Throttles - CUTOFF (P) Collective (Some spacecraft) - Neutral (P) Drag flaps - Check fully retracted (P) Radios, communication links, and navigational equipment - "Set" (P), (CP), (FE), (N), (CC) ADI's and flight directors - "Checked, Set" (P), (FE) Transponder - Checked, ON (P) Downlink status, uplink status, and data presentation - Checked (CP) Autothrottle - OFF (P) Autopilot - OFF (P) RCS switch and RCS mode switch - "ON, Translate" (P) Safety belt, shoulder harness - "Fastened" (P), (FE) Pre-Departure checks - "Complete" (FE), (N), (CC), (CP)

FE, N, CC Oxygen - "Set" (P), (FE) Regulator - ON, 100% Pressure suit - Purged Hoses, connections - Checked Helmet - On, visor open Fuel cells - On, checked (FE) Reactant valves A, B, C, D - Open Cryo bottles - Pressure checked Voltage, loadmeters - Checked, normal Avionics buses - Verified (FE) EFI's / flight directors - "ON" (P), (FE) FADECs - BIT, "Checked" (FE) INS and GPS - "Set" (N) Present position - Entered, verified System configuration - Checked INS mode - NAV GPS mode - NAV Flight trajectory plan - Verified Batteries - Checked, fully charged (FE) Radios, communication links, and navigational equipment - "Set" (P), (CP), (FE), (N), (CC) ADI's and flight directors - "Checked, Set" (P), (FE) INS, GPS, and INS-GPS delta - Checked, NAV mode (N) Flight director - Checked, correct presentation (N) Downlink status, uplink status, and data presentation - Checked (N), (CC) GHe pressurization switch - LOW (FE) RCS Valves - "Open" (FE) Collar Umbilical - "Retracted" (FE) Air Conditioning master switches - AUTO PRESS (FE) Safety belt, shoulder harness - "Fastened" (P), (FE) Pre-Departure checks - "Complete" (FE), (N), (CC), (CP)

AFTER UNDOCKING.

DE-ORBIT.

DESCENT.

These checks will be performed after re-entry heating has abated and before descending below 5,000 ft AGL.

PILOTS Radar altimeter - "Set" (Normally set 5000 feet) (P) Pressure altimeters - "Set, state setting" (P), (CP), (FE), (N) Autopilot - As required (P) Descent checks - "Complete" (FE), (N), (CC), (CP)

FE, N, CC Pressurization - Set (FE) Propellant boost pump switches - ON (FE) FADEC - As Required (FE) Chill valves - CLOSED (FE) Main valves - OPEN (FE) Mode select switch - "START" (FE) Descent checks - "Complete" (FE), (N), (CC), (CP)

BEFORE LANDING.

SECTION III - EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

This part of Section III contains the procedures to be used in coping with the various emergencies that may be encountered during spacecraft operations. A thorough knowledge of these procedures will enable crew members to perform their emergency duties in an orderly manner, and to judge more quickly the seriousness of the emergency. This will greatly increase the crew's chances for survival. The procedures consist of items classified as critical or noncritical. The critical items are actions that must be performed immediately to avoid aggravating the emergency and causing injury or damage. Critical items are presented in boldface type and must be committed to memory. Noncritical items are actions that contribute to an orderly sequence of events and will be performed in conjunction with reference to the appropriate checklist.

After determining that an emergency exists, the copilot should immediately establish communication with appropriate technical support and traffic control agencies. These should be given a complete description of the emergency, the action taken, and an accurate position report.

In the checklists presented, the codes P, CP, FE, N, and CC stand for pilot, copilot, flight engineer, navigator, and crew chief. This presentation does not preclude the pilot from redelegating these duties at crew briefing. The pilot will command initiation by calling for the procedure desired, but need not call out each step. The affected crewmembers will accomplish the required step in accordance with the appropriate checklist. The flight engineer will monitor all coordinated emergency procedures.

Regardless of the specific emergency encountered:

1. Maintain spacecraft control.
2. Analyze the situation.
3. Take the appropriate, coordinated, corrective action.

EMERGENCY SIGNALS.

In the event of imminent ground or inflight evacuation, personnel will be notified and given instructions. If time and circumstances permit, personnel will be notified verbally (interphone or PA system) of the emergency. If time and circumstances do not permit issuance of verbal emergency instructions, the following actions will be taken:

The appropriate emergency passenger information system lights will be activated (on spacecraft so equipped).

The emergency alarm bell will be used as follows:

Ground Evacuation

1. Abandon spacecraft -- one long sustained ring.

[A] Ejection.

The alarm bell will not be used. Instead, the verbal command "BAILOUT" will be given 3 times. In the event that the intercom system is not working between the P and FE stations, the appropriate visual signal will be used.

Crash Landing.

1. Crash landing imminent -- six short rings.
2. Brace for impact -- one long sustained ring.

Loss of Air Pressure.

When air pressure drops below a preset value, or decreases at more than 10% per minute, the audible siren will automatically sound and rotating lights illuminate, indicating pressure loss. The siren will also sound when the PRESSURE TENT FLOW is switched to on. Depressing the ALARM SILENCE button will silence the automatic alarm.

ENGINE SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS.

If any of the following conditions occur in flight or on the ground, an immediate engine shutdown is recommended. Engine shutdown will be at the pilot's discretion, depending on flight conditions and the situation.

When it is necessary to continue operation of an engine with any of these conditions present, in the interest of safety of the spacecraft and crew, operate the engine with extreme caution, and at the minimum power required.

WARNING : When shutting down an engine, consideration should be given to reducing power on or shutting down the diametrically opposite engine. This will ease loads on the flight control system, and side loads on the airframe. If the engine is not shut down, a sudden failure of an adjacent engine could result in exceeding flight control and engine thrust vectoring limits, and loss of control of the spacecraft.

NOTE : When shutting down an engine during the landing phase, the opposite engine should not be shut down. Instead, give consideration to restarting an adjacent sustainer engine at minimum power. Operation of the sustainer in the landing mode may cause excessive vibration in the nozzle; an inspection will be required before the next flight. Even if sensed vibration exceeds limits on this engine, continued operation throughout the landing may be necessary. Nozzle vibration may, however, mask a greater engine problem.

1. Engine fire.
2. Turbine overheat.
3. Engine bay overheat.
4. Excessive vibration light.
5. An uncontrollable rise in combustion temperature or pressure.
6. Propellant mixture ratio out of limits.
7. Uncontrollable power / throttle failure.
8. Loss of more than one flight station engine monitoring indicator, to include RPM, TIT, combustion temperature, combustion pressure, propellant flow indicators.
9. [A][B] Generator gearbox failure which fails to disengage.
10. [C] Turbo-alternator overheat where tapoff valve fails to close.

IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS:

ENGINE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE

1. AFFECTED THROTTLE - "CUTOFF" (FE)
2. FIRE HANDLE - "PULLED" (FE)

   NOTE : Do not perform this step if the first step results in a positive alleviation of the shutdown condition. Pulling the fire handle can cause turbine damage through lack of cooling and lubrication, and duct collapse due to suction from the propellant pumps. Shutdown when RPM is below 30% will not result in damage. If the fire handle must be pulled for a continued fire indication, waiting for turbine RPM decrease will significantly increase the hazard, and is thus not recommended.

   WARNING : Do not attempt to restart an engine which has been shut down with the fire handle at RPM above 30%. Propellant leaking from damaged ducts presents a serious fire and explosion hazard.

3. AGENT - "DISCHARGED" (FOR FIRE OR OVERHEAT) (FE)

   NOTE : The agent should be discharged when an indication continues after the fire handle has been pulled, or if any other indication or malfunction is suspected which requires fire extinguisher agent.

   NOTE : The fire extinguishing agent is armed and routed through the use of the fire handle. If agent is to be used, the fire handle MUST be pulled first.

   CAUTION : Do not attempt to restart an engine into which fire extinguishing agent has been discharged.

4. CLEANUP -"COMPLETE" (FE)
   1. Engine door (some spacecraft) - CLOSED
   2. Fire Handle (if not already pulled) - PULLED (when RPM decreases below 30%)
   3. Throttle - Full Forward

ABORT OF TAKEOFF.

Consider aborting the takeoff or climbout whenever there is an engine failure, unless the mission is considered essential. If necessary, the mission can be continued even when an engine fails at takeoff and the opposite engine is also shut down, provided sufficient operational payload margin was maintained.

An abort is imperative when an engine fire or overheat continues after agent discharge, when the passenger compartment depressurizes, or when any avionics malfunction occurs that might hamper spacecraft control.

1. THROTTLES - AS REQUIRED (P)
2. DRAG FLAPS - "DEPLOYED" (WHEN BELOW 350 KIAS AND STAGNATION TEMPERATURE PROBE BELOW 500 DEGREES C) (P)

   NOTE : Deploying drag flaps at indicated airspeeds above 350 KIAS or stagnation temperature above 500 degrees C will not result in significant deceleration, but will risk flap and engine bay damage, and engine bay overheat warnings that may or may not be erroneous.

3. HOVER - "ESTABLISHED" (P)

   NOTE : From full takeoff gross weight, fuel burn in hover can be expected to reduce the spacecraft weight to landing gross weight in approximately 18 minutes.

   NOTE : Weight reduction can be expedited through the opening of the emergency LOX dump plugs. Offload will initially increase to nearly 400,000 lbs/min., then taper off as LOX quantity decreases. Use of the LOX dump plugs will result in a heavyweight landing, as the vehicle will land with a nearly-full load of LH2. The dumping will create a significant fire hazard, and should not be considered if the exterior of the vehicle is burning. Under no circumstances should LOX be dumped below 5,000 feet where there is a possibility that the LOX could fall on personnel.

If an abort is initiated immediately after takeoff, and LOX plugs are opened immediately, the vehicle can land in 4.5 minutes at twice landing gross weight.

4. LAND - WHEN GROSS WEIGHT IS LESS THAN ALLOWABLE LANDING GROSS WEIGHT.

   NOTE : Landings above allowable landing gross weight are not recommended, but may be necessary depending on the severity of the emergency. Landing above twice landing gross weight can be expected to result in severe damage to the landing gear and support structures. Landing above approximately three times landing gross weight is expected to cause total landing gear collapse, followed by possible toppling of the vehicle.

   CAUTION : When returning to a launch site which is also the landing site, ensure the spacecraft lands clear of the milking stool. If the vehicle is landed partially on the milking stool, severe damage to the boat-tail area may result.

MILKSTOOL LANDING.

In cases of very grave takeoff emergency, it may be necessary to set the spacecraft back on the ground immediately after takeoff is attempted, as for example when more than one engine fails catastrophically after applying takeoff power. In such a case, a "milkstool landing" may be necessary. Landing on the milkstool is an extremely hazardous procedure, and should only be attempted when absolutely necessary and the spacecraft is low enough that it has not had time to drift from the milkstool's position. As a rough guide, a milkstool landing may be attempted even after the altimeter has started to increase; but if the VVI has also swung into the positive range, spacecraft altitude is probably too great. If, however, the VVI is still negative, an immediate power reduction on all engines to approximately 70% will ensure a quick descent, minimizing the likelihood that the spacecraft will have drifted away from the milkstool support points. Do not attempt to steer back to the milkstool's presumed position, as it cannot be seen from the flight station. Radio coaching from the ground is not recommended unless there is no other option. Consider also the presence of crosswinds when considering whether a milkstool landing is possible.

[C] TURBO-ALTERNATOR OVERHEAT.

1. AFFECTED TURBO-ALTERNATOR - "OFF" (FE)

Monitor engine instruments for a slight rise in chamber pressure. If this is not seen, the tapoff valve has not closed, and engine shutdown will be necessary.

AVIONICS BAY FIRE.

1. FLIGHT AVIONICS - "ALTERNATE SET" (FE)
2. AVIONICS BAY AGENT - "DISCHARGED" (INTO APPROPRIATE BAY) (FE)

If the fire continues, continue with the Electrical Fire checklist.

ELECTRICAL FIRE. (COCKPIT OR AVIONICS BAY)

1. ALL ENGINE-DRIVEN GENERATORS/TA'S AND FUEL CELLS, EXCEPT ONE DRIVING BUS A - "OFF" (FE)

   NOTE : Check for proper operation of the backup GPS flight director at this time.

IF FIRE CONTINUES:

2. REMAINING GENERATOR/TA OR FUEL CELL "OFF" (FE)

Follow procedures for loss of all electrical power. If possible, isolate the offending system or bus and pull the affected circuit breakers. Restore partial electrical power with utmost caution.

INFLIGHT CABIN PRESSURE LOSS.

1. OXYGEN - "ON, 100 PERCENT, HELMETS SEALED" (P)

For passenger-carrying spacecraft where the passenger deck is affected:

2. INTERWALL SEALANT - "DISCHARGED" (FE)
3. PRESSURE TENT FLOW - "ON" (FE)

   NOTE : Actuation of the air flow in the passenger pressure tents will also illuminate the SEAL PRESSURE TENTS light, sound the audible alarm, and light the rotating lights. Press the ALARM EXTINGUISH button to silence the alarm. The lights will remain lit as long as there is an under-pressure situation.

LANDING GEAR FAILS TO DEPLOY.

1. HOVER - "ESTABLISHED" (P)
2. LANDING GEAR ALTERNATE EXTENSION - "PULLED" (P)

IF LANDING GEAR REMAINS INCOMPLETELY DEPLOYED:

3. LANDING GEAR - "UP, THEN DOWN" (P)

   NOTE : This step is necessary to re-establish [A][B] hydraulic pressure or [C] motor gearing on the landing gear.

4. GEAR PARTIAL-RETRACT BUTTON - "PRESSED" (FOR LANDING GEAR OPPOSITE FAILED GEAR) (P)
5. ROLL ANGLE - "ESTABLISHED" (P)

   NOTE : Roll the vehicle to align the known wind vector with a line drawn between the two remaining full-length landing gear. In the event of a landing on a sloped surface, give consideration to placing the shortened leg on the highest side, regardless of wind.

6. RCS - "OVERRIDE" (FE)
7. LAND. AFTER TOUCHDOWN, APPLY FULL STICK DEFLECTION OPPOSITE FAILED GEAR. HOLD UNTIL SETTLED ON THIRD GEAR.

   WARNING : A normal landing should result in a two-point landing. The application of full stick deflection opposite the failed gear with RCS in OVERRIDE should result in the spacecraft settling on the shortened gear within 3 seconds. Be alert for the possibility of over-rotation, which would lift the two full-length gear off the ground or possibly even topple the vehicle. Do not allow excessive concern for this possibility to cause the vehicle to settle toward the wrong side.

   NOTE : Should more than one leg fail to deploy, or should the partial-retract button fail to actuate, raise the landing gear and land gear-up.

[A] EJECTION.

1. HANDGRIPS - RAISE (P), (FE)

The McDonnell Douglas ACES II seats mounted in the P and FE positions are zero-zero seats, meaning that ejection from ground level without any relative airstream velocity will in theory still allow a successful ejection. Additional altitude, or any airstream velocity to aid in parachute inflation, will further improve the chances of successful ejection.

However, the landing profile of the S-1 involves very high sink rates (over 12000 fpm) close to the ground. Accordingly, at maximum sink rate, ejection must be initiated above 2000 ft AGL in order to allow for chute inflation before ground contact.

The seats installed in the S-1 are fired independently. There is no provision for sequential ejection, nor for remote or automatic ejection.

The following sequence of events is initiated by pulling the ejection handles with at least 60 lbs of force:

0.05 s

The overhead polycarbonate window is ejected by a gas charge. Should the window fail to eject, further events in the ejection sequence will be suspended until the situation is remedied. There is no provision for ejection through the window; it is too thick for such an ejection to be survivable.

0.3 s

The seat begins to move up the rails. An initial gas charge is supplemented by a rocket charge.

0.6 s

The seat is clear of the ejection rails. The seat's internal gyro platform begins to orient the seat towards the local vertical.

1.2 s

Maximum G-loading is reached. With a typical pressure-suited pilot, the seat will develop 12 G's of acceleration.

2.3 s

seat's rocket booster is exhausted.

2.4 s

The drogue rocket fires, deploying the drogue chute.

2.9 s

Drogue chute fully inflated. Seat-Man separator fires. Main chute pulled out by drogue.

3.1 s

Main chute fully deployed.

ENGINE FIRE (GROUND/INFLIGHT).

Engine fires are indicated by a steady illumination of the red lights in the respective fire handle, and the flashing illumination of the MASTER CAUTION light. If an engine fire is experienced, proceed as follows:

On the ground, move all throttles to IDLE and proceed with the Engine Shutdown Procedure.

In flight, proceed with the Engine Shutdown Procedure.

TURBINE OVERHEAT.

An overheat in either turbine section is indicated by a steady illumination of the yellow lights in the respective fire handle, and illumination of the MASTER CAUTION light. Proceed as for an engine fire.

ENGINE BAY OVERHEAT.

An overheat within the engine bay is indicated by a flashing illumination of the red lights in the respective fire handle, and illumination of the MASTER CAUTION light. A subsequent engine fire will cause the red lights to remain flashing, but will re-illuminate the MASTER CAUTION light. If an engine fire proceeds to a fire in the engine bay, the red lights will begin flashing, and the MASTER CAUTION light will re-illuminate. Proceed as follows:

On the ground, move all throttles to IDLE and proceed with the Engine Shutdown Procedure.

In flight, proceed with the Engine Shutdown Procedure. Consider opening drag flaps slightly, if within operating limits, to vent the engine bay.

Whether on the ground or in flight, consideration should be given to discharging the agent regardless of the absence or continuation of warning indications.

GROUND EVACUATION.

1. Notify ATC. (CP)
2. Place all throttles to CUTOFF and pull all fire handles. (FE)
3. Notify crew and passengers to evacuate the spacecraft. (Interphone, PA system, information lights, and alarm bell.) (FE)

   WARNING : If an unextinguished engine fire exists, consideration should be given to using only the passenger escape run on the opposite side.

4. DC power switch - OFF (FE)
5. Evacuate by donning an escape sling and descending on the crew escape run.

   WARNING : All personnel other than those in the fire department should evacuate the immediate area. As much separation as possible should be gained from the vehicle. If motorized transportation is available, it should be used to gain a half-mile separation. If it is not, consider 600 feet clearance, with an intervening solid object, to be the minimum acceptable separation.

DITCHING.

A water landing in the S-1 spacecraft is not recommended. However, the spacecraft should float upright long enough to allow crew and passenger escape.

To perform a water landing, the landing gear should be left retracted, and the drag flaps opened fully. The vehicle should be below landing gross weight; a heavyweight landing will result in the vehicle sinking quickly.

WARNING : If a water landing is a possibility, under no circumstances should the LOX dump plugs be opened. A water landing with an empty LOX tank and a partially-full LH2 tank can make the vehicle top-heavy enough to capsize and stabilize nose-down in the water.

ESCAPE RUN OPERATION.

Unlike horizontal-takeoff airplanes, the S-1's design unavoidably places the passenger section at a considerable height above the ground. An ordinary aircraft escape slide would be unacceptably long and sturdy to accommodate such an escape path.

Therefore, the S-1 employs a system of escape runs. There are three escape runs: two passenger runs at the front and back of the passenger compartments (12 and 6 o'clock positions), and one crew escape run, parallel to the 12 o'clock passenger run. That passenger run and the crew escape run are close enough to allow a crew member on one to descend to a trapped individual on the other, and help to free them.

The runs themselves consist of a kevlar cable recessed into the spacecraft skin, and a friction-motor runner which descends along it. The runner has a D-ring for mounting a standard navy sling.

To employ the escape run, the individual first dons the navy sling, fastening it in front of their face. Then, the sling's hook is attached to the D-ring on the next available runner. Then, the individual steps out the hatch and allows their weight to pull the runner down; descent speed is kept constant by the friction motor. It is advisable to "walk" with hands and feet down along the surface of the spacecraft to avoid recontact and abrasion.

WARNING : The sling must always be fastened in front of the face, which ensures the individual cannot fall out. If the sling is fastened behind an individual's head, it is likely they will slip out of the sling and fall to the ground.

WARNING : When descending on the escape run, ensure that hands, feet, and other body parts always touch the insulated area within 18 inches of the cable run. Personnel touching an uninsulated area of a partially-fueled vehicle run the risk of having their skin freeze to the vehicle exterior, causing grave injury.

ELECTRICAL FAILURE.

Total failure of all on-board electrical systems is extremely unlikely. Each AC-powered individual component is capable of choosing from between two of the four AC buses available. Each bus can be powered from any of three generators or turbo-alternators, or from any fuel cell. The two DC buses, plus the battery bus, likewise ensure that no single short-circuit can take out all components.

In the unlikely event of total failure of on-board electronics, the backup GPS flight director and the voice satellite link are powered by their own batteries and completely independent of other spacecraft components. Both are designed to remain operable even after a direct lightning strike on the spacecraft.

In addition to the backup GPS flight director and the voice satellite link, the following components will also be operable:

Pitot-static instruments to include pressure altimeter, VVI, airspeed indicator.

Mechanical control of forward RCS jets using sidearm controller.

Mechanical control of main engines using throttles, with differential control using sidearm controller through the mechanical mixer. Auto-shutdown, compensation, and stability-enhancement features of the FADEC are disabled.

RPM gauges. Other engine instruments will be non-functional.

Engine start buttons and ignitors are independently powered through the engine start batteries.

Emergency landing gear extension.

Cabin pressurization, on mechanical systems only, and CO2 scrubbers at partial capacity.

In addition, items connected directly to the battery bus will remain operable in most likely scenarios. This will allow fire warning, agent discharge, and alarm bells.